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Abstract 12 
We define consciousness as the category of all conscious experiences. This immediately raises 13 
the question: What is the essence in which every conscious experience in the category of 14 
conscious experiences partakes? We consider various abstract essences of conscious experiences 15 
as theories of consciousness. They are: (i) conscious experience is an action of memory on 16 
sensation, (ii) conscious experience is experiencing a particular as an exemplar of a general, (iii) 17 
conscious experience is an interpretation of sensation, (iv) conscious experience is referring 18 
sensation to an object as its cause, and (v) conscious experience is a model of stimulus. 19 
Corresponding to each one of these theories we obtain a category of models of conscious 20 
experiences: (i) category of actions, (ii) category of idempotents, (iii) category of two sequential 21 
maps, (iv) category of brain-generalized figures, and (v) functor categories with intuition as base 22 
and conceptual repertoire as exponent, respectively. For each theory of consciousness we also 23 
calculate its truth value object and characterize the objective logic intrinsic to the corresponding 24 
category of models of consciousness experiences.  25 
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Introduction 26 
What is consciousness? Consciousness, according to Koch, ―is everything you experience. It is 27 
the tune stuck in your head, the sweetness of chocolate mousse, the throbbing pain of a 28 
toothache, the fierce love for your child and the bitter knowledge that eventually all feelings will 29 
end‖ (Koch, 2018, p. S9). This raises two foundational questions: 30 
1. What is the nature of conscious experiences? 31 
2. What is the nature of consciousness? 32 
How are we to think of the totality of conscious experiences i.e., consciousness? How are we to 33 
think of the constituents of consciousness i.e., conscious experiences? One obvious answer: 34 
Conscious experiences are objects of the category of all conscious experiences and 35 
consciousness is the category of conscious experiences. In other words, every conscious 36 
experience has the essence of the category of conscious experiences, whatever the essence(s) 37 
maybe. This characterization is in the spirit of asserting that a chair is an object of the category 38 
of chairs. 39 
   Let us consider a visual experience: a face. A first-order approximation would represent the 40 
experience as a point in a feature-space or as a set of features i.e., Face = {eyes, nose, mouth} 41 
(Fodor, 1998). Sensory features are obviously structured, unlike the structureless elements of sets 42 
(Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, p. 1). Equally importantly, sensory features of a visual object 43 
are related to one another in specific ways resulting in a cohesive object that is conscious 44 
experience, which cannot be modelled as a set with its zero internal cohesion (Lawvere and 45 
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Schanuel, 2009, p. 146). Elementism, notwithstanding the Gestalt demonstrations (Albright et 46 
al., 2000, p. S34), continues to be the default terminology as in analysing ―perceptual experience 47 
into a collection of simple sensory elements‖ (Albright, 2013a, p. 19). Along similar lines, mind 48 
is defined as a set of brain functions (Bunge, 1981, p. 68; Kandel, 2013, p. 546). The claim that 49 
‗mind is a set‘ is repeatedly asserted in the textbook Principles of Neural Science (Kandel et al., 50 
2013, p. 5, 334, 384), which takes on added significance in light of its pedagogical value in 51 
training neuroscientists. Of course, this terminology does not reflect any failure to recognize that, 52 
in terms of the above example of face perception, the constituent eyes, nose, and mouth, unlike 53 
the structureless elements of a set, are figures of various shapes; these figures constituting a face 54 
are related to one another in specific ways (cf. Croner and Albright, 1999). Nevertheless, it does 55 
highlight the absence and the significance of having a conceptual repertoire that fits the reality of 56 
conscious experiences. Here we put forward mathematical category as a construct suited for the 57 
study of consciousness (Lawvere, 1994; Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, p. 21, 135-148). In line 58 
with the commonplace understanding of the notion of category, a mathematical category consists 59 
of objects all of which partake in the essence that is characteristic of the category; since every 60 
object of the category partakes in the essence, the transformations of objects preserve the essence 61 
(e.g. in the category of dogs, a transformation of an young dog into an old dog preserves the 62 
―dogness‖). We find that defining conscious experience as an object of the category of conscious 63 
experiences, instead of as cohesion-less set of structure-less elements, provides the conceptual 64 
repertoire—basic shapes, figures, and incidence relations—needed to reason about the essence of 65 
conscious experiences and the essence-preserving transformations of conscious experiences. 66 
 67 
5 
  
Theory of Conscious Experiences 68 
What is the essence of conscious experiences? Continuing with our example of face perception, 69 
an experience of a face can be said to consist of figures of various shapes: two eye-shaped 70 
figures, one nosed-shaped figure, and one mouth-shaped figure. Of these shapes, we can say that 71 
eye, nose, and mouth are the basic shapes, and their incidence relations determine the mutual 72 
relations between various basic-shaped figures constituting the face (Lawvere and Schanuel, 73 
2009, pp. 82-83, 250-253, 369-371). When considering conscious experience in general, we may 74 
treat sensory features (e.g. colour, shape), modalities (visual, tactile, etc.), and emotion, among 75 
others, as basic shapes. For illustration, anger (in conscious experience) can be considered as an 76 
emotion-shaped figure (in the experience) just as redness can be thought of as a colour-shaped 77 
figure. The mutual relations between basic shapes, say, emotion and colour, determine the 78 
mutual relations between figures of the corresponding shapes (anger and redness). 79 
   Basic shapes along with their incidence relations constitute the abstract essence or theory of the 80 
category of conscious experiences (Lawvere, 2003, p. 215, 217; Lawvere, 2004a, pp. 10-12; 81 
Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, pp. 154-155, 235-236; Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, pp. 149-82 
151, 369-371). First, every experience has the essence [of the category of conscious experiences] 83 
given by the basic shapes and their incidence relations. Next, every experience can be 84 
represented as a structure formed of basic-shaped figures and their mutual relations induced by 85 
the incidences of basic shapes (see Fig. 4 in Posina, Ghista, and Roy, 2017). Since every 86 
experience has the essence of experiences, transformations of experiences are required to 87 
preserve the essence of experiences, and as such are natural transformations (Lawvere and 88 
Schanuel, 2009, p. 378). Geometrically speaking, natural transformations ‗do not tear‘ the 89 
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structure transformed (ibid, p. 210). Philosophically, a natural transformation is: Becoming 90 
consistent with Being (e.g. biological growth; Posina, 2016). 91 
   What are we to make of the totality of all conscious experiences along with their essence-92 
preserving transformations? Objects along with essence-preserving morphisms of objects form a 93 
category. With experiences as objects [with a given structural essence] and essence-preserving 94 
transformations of experiences as structure-preserving morphisms of objects, consciousness—the 95 
totality of conscious experiences—can be construed as a category of conscious experiences. Note 96 
that any experience can remain the same (identity transformation). If I went from sad to happy 97 
and from happy to detached, then I went from sad to detached (composition of transformations of 98 
experiences). Along these lines, other axioms and laws, which are required to be satisfied in 99 
order for us to talk about a category of experiences, can be verified (Lawvere and Schanuel, 100 
2009, p. 21, 149-160). Within this categorical framework, the structure of consciousness is an 101 
external reflection of the structural essence of conscious experiences (Lawvere, 1972, p. 10). 102 
More immediately, a category embodies a mode of cohesion (Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, p. 103 
146), which is the most basic attribute of conscious experience. For example, parts of a body 104 
(hands, legs, etc.) have a mode of cohesion, which is different from the mode of cohesion of 105 
parts of a perceptual object (colour, shape). Note that ‗part‘ is both itself and its relationship to 106 
the whole (Lawvere, 1994, p. 53). Formally, a part of an object is not merely a subobject, but a 107 
monomorphism specifying the inclusion of the subobject into the object (Lawvere and Schanuel, 108 
2009, p. 335). 109 
   As illustrations of theory of a category and its basic shapes, we present simple theories 110 
(abstract essences) of conscious experiences (in the spirit of Lawvere, 1999). More explicitly, the 111 
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mathematical method, according to F. William Lawvere, ―consists of taking the main structure 112 
[of an object] by itself as a first approximation to a theory of the object, i.e. mentally operating as 113 
though all further structure of the object simply did not exist‖ (Lawvere, 1972, pp. 9-10). An 114 
example of an abstract theory of conscious experiences is ‗particular as an exemplar of a general‘ 115 
(cf. categorical perception; Albright, 2013b, pp. 628-630; Grossberg, 1976), whose models form 116 
a category of idempotents (Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, pp. 99-106), with exemplar as its basic 117 
shape. The truth value object of the category of idempotents has three global truth values. With 118 
‗interpretation of sensation‘ (Albright and Stoner, 1995; Croner and Albright, 1999; Schlack and 119 
Albright, 2007) as a theory of conscious experiences, we obtain a category of two sequential 120 
processes as the category of conscious experiences. Here, the basic shapes are physical stimuli, 121 
neural sensation of stimuli, and conscious interpretation of sensation. With conscious experience 122 
as an object of the category of two sequential functions, we find that the objective logic intrinsic 123 
to consciousness has four truth values (Posina, Ghista, and Roy, 2017, pp. 172-174). We also 124 
consider ‗action of memory on sensation‘ (Albright, 2012, Fig. 5, 8; Hopfield, 1982; Lawvere 125 
and Schanuel, 2009, p. 218), ‗referring sensation to an object as its cause‘ (Albright, 2015, p. 22; 126 
Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, pp. 125-126, 148-152), and ‗model of stimulus‘ (Chalmers, 127 
2006; Posina, Ghista, and Roy, 2017) as theories of conscious experiences. 128 
   Given a category of experiences, how do we abstract the theory (essence) of experiences? 129 
Theorization begins with measurements of properties of the objects of the given category. 130 
Oftentimes, we find that there is small subcategory of properties (and their determinations) 131 
within the category of all properties that constitutes the abstract essence shared by all objects of 132 
the given category. This abstract essence in which every object of a given category partakes is 133 
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the theory of the given category (Lawvere, 1994, pp. 44-47; Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, pp. 134 
154-155; Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, pp. 149-150; see also Fig. 5 in Posina, Ghista, and Roy, 135 
2017). In geometric terminology, we consider a subcategory of basic shapes and their incidence 136 
relations, and examine if figures with objects in the subcategory as shapes are adequate to 137 
completely characterize every object of the category and tell apart transformations between 138 
objects (Lawvere, 1994, p. 49; Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, pp. 369-371). In the following we 139 
focus on the calculation of truth value objects corresponding to various theories of conscious 140 
experiences and the subsequent characterization of the objective logic intrinsic to various 141 
categories of models of conscious experiences (ibid, pp. 335-357). 142 
 143 
Action of Memory on Sensation 144 
Conscious experience of a given physical stimulus can be thought of as an action of memory on 145 
the sensation elicited by the stimulus (for a vivid illustration of the action of memory on 146 
sensation, see Fig. 5 and 8 in Albright, 2012). A formalization of conscious experience as an 147 
action of memory on sensation is provided by Hopfield (1982). Here sensation S is a 1 × n 148 
feature vector, with each one of the elements of the vector S representing the activity of each one 149 
of the n feature-selective neurons. Memory M, or the n × n synaptic weight matrix, is a result of 150 
associative learning, and can be expressed as a product of the sensation S with its transpose S
T
, 151 
i.e. 152 
M = S
T
 × S 153 
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Conscious experience C(S) corresponding to sensation S is: 154 
C(S) = S × M. 155 
For a given memory, conscious experiences corresponding to various sensations have the 156 
structure of idempotents (as discussed in detail in appendix A1). Categorical perception, wherein 157 
particulars (stimuli) are perceived as exemplars of a general (category; Albright, 2013b, pp. 628-158 
630), also has the structure of idempotents. The abstract essence or theory of the category of 159 
idempotents consists of one basic shape: exemplar, along with an idempotent endomap as the 160 
structural map. Unlike the classical Boolean logic of sets, we find that the truth value object of 161 
the category of idempotents consists of three truth values. Also, two dual forms of negation—162 
not, non—can be defined (Lawvere, 1986, 1991). We find that double negation can be greater or 163 
less than identity depending on the exact nature of negation. Furthermore, the category of 164 
idempotents admits logical contradiction (Lawvere, 2003, p. 214-215; or boundary operation 165 
defined as the intersection of a part with its negation; Lawvere, 1994, p. 48; Lawvere and 166 
Rosebrugh, 2003, p. 201). 167 
 168 
Interpretation of Sensation 169 
Conscious experience involves two sequential processes of sensation (of stimulus) followed by 170 
interpretation of the sensation. A classic illustration of the two sequential processes involved in 171 
conscious experience is R. C. James‘s image (Miller, 1999). When looking at the image one 172 
initially sees black and white blobs of various sizes and shapes, which subsequently, in light of 173 
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the concept DALMATIAN, is perceptually interpreted as a dog. That conscious experience is 174 
mediated by the two processes of sensation followed by interpretation is well-established in 175 
various perceptual modalities (e.g. Albright and Stoner, 1995; Croner and Albright, 1999). Thus 176 
the abstract theory of consciousness consists of three basic shapes i.e. objects (Physical Stimuli, 177 
Neural Codes, and Conscious Experiences) and two incidence relations i.e. maps (sensation and 178 
interpretation) organized as shown below: 179 
Physical Stimuli –sensation→ Neural Codes –interpretation→ Conscious Experiences 180 
The truth value object of the category of models of conscious experiences of the above theory of 181 
consciousness consists of four global truth values (Fig. 6c in Posina, Ghista, and Roy, 2017 182 
depicts the internal diagram of the truth value object; see Appendix A2 in Posina and Roy, 2018 183 
for the calculation of the truth value object; see also Linton, 2005).   184 
 185 
Brain-generalized Figures 186 
Everyday experience of effectively interacting with objects of conscious experience indicates 187 
that conscious experience of objects is recovery of the objects based on the sensation elicited by 188 
the objects (i.e. constructing an object isomorphic to the cause of sensation; Albright, 2015, p. 189 
22; Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, pp. 125-126, 148-152). In reconstructing objects in conscious 190 
experience, we encounter the possibility of not only the commonplace isomorphism between 191 
objects and conscious experience of objects, but also illusory conscious experiences with no 192 
correspondent underlying objects. We now present a mathematical framework rich enough to 193 
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capture both veridical perception and illusions (Lawvere, 2004b). Given a stimulus A, we define 194 
sensation p as a brain V-valued property of the stimulus A, i.e. 195 
p: A → V 196 
Next, we consider brain V-valued properties of sensations, i.e. 197 
q: V
A
 → V 198 
which may be considered as a special case of interpretation of sensation, i.e. a neural measure of 199 
sensation. Perceived element is defined as a brain V-generalized point of A satisfying naturality 200 
conditions (discussed in detail in appendix A2). Within this mathematical framework, we find 201 
that defining brain V as neuronal states of ‗firing‘ and ‗not firing‘, i.e. as a two-element property 202 
type, can give rise to illusions. However, defining brain V in terms of all possible changes in 203 
neuronal firing rate, i.e. as a three-element set V = {decreased firing rate, constant firing rate, 204 
increased firing rate}, ensures illusion-free perception, or isomorphism between elements of a 205 
stimulus set and perceived elements. As we have been emphasizing, physical stimuli, neural 206 
sensations, and conscious experiences are much more structured than structureless sets; as such 207 
we are working on refining the mathematical framework to accommodate conscious experience 208 
defined as brain-generalized figure of stimuli (for basic shapes and their incidences of the 209 
categories corresponding to physical stimuli and neural sensation). 210 
 211 
 212 
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Model of Physical Stimulus 213 
Of the various abstract essences (theories) of conscious experiences, the most basic 214 
characterization of conscious experience is: conscious experience of a stimulus is a model of the 215 
stimulus (Chalmers, 2006). This immediately suggests functorial semantics, which provides a 216 
mathematical account of constructing models of particulars, as an abstract theory of conscious 217 
experience (Lawvere, 1994, 2004a). Given a category of physical stimulus, a model or conscious 218 
experience of the stimulus is calculated by abstracting the essence (mental concepts) of its brain-219 
valued properties i.e. sensation. Thus abstracted mental concepts are then interpreted into a 220 
background category of intuition to obtain models of the physical stimuli or conscious 221 
experiences. The objective logic of conscious experiences construed as functor categories, with 222 
intuition as base and mental concepts as exponent, is not classical (Posina, Ghista, and Roy, 223 
2017). Furthermore, subjectivity (understood as viewpoint; cf. Sen, 1993) is captured by the 224 
framework of functorial semantics; more specifically, the mathematical construct of monad 225 
determines how a category of particulars is [subjectively] generalized into the adjoint pair of 226 
functors: mental concepts (theories) and conscious percepts (defined as functorial interpretation 227 
of concepts into a background of intuition or models; Eilenberg and Moore, 1965; Lawvere, 228 
1994, 2004a). As such, functorial semantics is the objective logic (as defined in Lawvere, 1994, 229 
p. 43) of consciousness. 230 
   231 
 232 
 233 
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Conclusions 234 
We defined conscious experience as an object of the category of conscious experiences, which 235 
aligns with the intuitions engendered by our everyday experiences with objects (cf. a table is an 236 
object of a category of tables). It is fascinating to note that the most advanced scientific 237 
understanding of object (as an object of a category of objects; Lawvere, 2015) is in accord with 238 
our ordinary experience. The category of conscious experiences provides the conceptual 239 
repertoire—basic shapes, figures, and incidences—needed to develop an adequately explicit 240 
theory of conscious experience. Given that the objective logic intrinsic to conscious experiences 241 
is not classical for a variety of abstract essences of consciousness that we considered, it would be 242 
interesting to compare the objective logic of consciousness with quantum logic that was found to 243 
better account for cognition compared to the classical logic (Roy, 2016). 244 
 245 
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Appendices 252 
A1. Category of Idempotents 253 
Let‘s consider, within the framework of Hopfield model (1982), a neural network consisting of 254 
two neurons coding for two features. For a given stimulus, a neuron can respond with a decrease, 255 
constant, or increase in its firing rate. So, we have nine 1 × 2 vectors as possible sensations S: 256 
S1 = [-1 -1] 257 
S2 = [-1 0] 258 
S3 = [-1 +1] 259 
S4 = [0 -1] 260 
S5 = [0 0] 261 
S6 = [0 +1] 262 
S7 = [+1 -1] 263 
S8 = [+1 0] 264 
S9 = [+1 +1] 265 
We define memory as a synaptic weight matrix M with entries given by associative learning: 266 
mij = si × sj 267 
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where (subscripts) i, j index the two neurons. For example, memory M1 of sensation S1 is: 268 
M1 = S1
T
 × S1 269 
(T denotes transpose), which is a 2 × 2 weight matrix. Substituting the values of sensation S1, we 270 
find: 271 
 272 
Next, we define perception P as an action of memory M on sensation S: 273 
P = S × M 274 
With memory M = M1, we find the percepts resulting from the action of memory M1 on the nine 275 
sensations: 276 
P1 = S1 × M1 = 2[-1 -1] 277 
P2 = S2 × M1 = [-1 -1] 278 
P3 = S3 × M1 = [0 0] 279 
P4 = S4 × M1 = [-1 -1] 280 
P5 = S5 × M1 = [0 0] 281 
P6 = S6 × M1 = [+1 +1] 282 
P7 = S7 × M1 = [0 0] 283 
1 1 
1 1 
M1 = 
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P8 = S8 × M1 = [+1 +1] 284 
P9 = S9 × M1 = 2[+1 +1] 285 
Note that P1, P5, and P9 are fixed-points (with, say, S1 as initial state and P1 (= S1) as final state in 286 
the language of dynamical systems), while sensations S1, S2, and S4 perceived as P1; sensations 287 
S3, S5, and S7 perceived as P5; sensations S6, S8, and S9 perceived as P9. The dynamics of action 288 
of memory on sensation has the structure of idempotents as displayed below: 289 
 290 
 291 
 292 
 293 
The above neural network can be formalized with action P of memory M on sensation S defined 294 
as a map: 295 
P: S × M → S 296 
For a neural network of N neurons, memories M are N × N matrices, which when thought of 297 
endomaps N → N, and with matrix multiplication as composition (of endomaps; MacLane, 1998, 298 
p. 11), form a monoid (Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, p. 167). The N × N matrix with all 299 
diagonal elements as 1 serves as monoid identity (ibid, p. 77), while the N × N matrix with all 300 
S4 S2 
S1 
S8 S6 
S9 
S7 
S5 
S3 
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entries as 0 is a constant C, since C × M = C for all memories M. Since this is the only constant 301 
of the monoid of memories, the category of actions (Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, p. 360): 302 
P: S × M → S 303 
forms a topos of idempotents (ibid, p. 367), i.e. a category with truth value object. The truth 304 
value object of the category of idempotents has three truth values: 305 
V = {false, u, true} 306 
equipped with an idempotent endomap: 307 
v: V → V 308 
defined as 309 
v(false) = false, v(u) = true, and v(true) = true. 310 
   Categorical perception, wherein a particular (rose) is perceived as an exemplar of a general 311 
(flower), also has the structure of idempotents (see also Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, p. 106): 312 
 313 
 314 
 315 
Given the splitting of idempotent endomaps into section-retract pairs, the category of 316 
idempotents can also be characterized in terms of the opposite pair of section-retract maps, 317 
lily rose 
flower 
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wherein the basic shapes are particulars and generals, while sorting and exemplifying are the 318 
incidence relations between the two basic shapes (Kathpalia, Posina, and Nagaraj, 2017). 319 
   We now calculate the truth value object of the category of idempotents. Truth value object of 320 
the category of idempotents is an object of the category of idempotents (just as in the case of 321 
sets, where a two-element set 2 = {false, true} is the truth value object of the category of sets). 322 
An object of the category of idempotents (modelled in the category of sets) is a set A equipped 323 
with an idempotent endomap 324 
a: A → A 325 
satisfying 326 
a ◦ a = a. 327 
where ‗◦‘ denotes composition of maps. A map f from an idempotent a to an idempotent b 328 
(where b: B → B satisfying b ◦ b = b) is a function 329 
f: A → B 330 
satisfying 331 
f ◦ a = b ◦ f. 332 
The truth value object of a category is defined as an object representing every part 333 
(monomorphism) of any object of the category. The truth value object can be calculated in terms 334 
of the inverse images of parts of basic shapes along incidence relations (structural maps). Basic 335 
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shapes along with incidence relations constitute the abstract essence or the theory of a given 336 
category. What are the basic shapes and their incidences constituting the theory of category of 337 
idempotents? The theory of idempotents consists of a generic idempotent E, along with an [non-338 
identity] idempotent endomap e on E (as shown below): 339 
 340 
 341 
 342 
 343 
The basic shape E along with the incidence relation e together constitute the theory subcategory 344 
E of the category of idempotents. The basic shape E has three parts false, u, and true (shown 345 
below), which, by the definition of truth value object, correspond to three E-shaped figures (truth 346 
values) in the truth value object of the category of idempotents. 347 
 348 
  349 
 350 
The idempotent endomap v: V → V, where V = {false, u, true}, is given by the inverse images of 351 
the three parts along the incidence relation e: E → E. The inverse image of the part false along e 352 
is false; the inverse image of the part u along e is true; and the inverse image of the part true 353 
E E 
e 
E 
E E 
true 
G E 
u 
0 E 
false 
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along e is also true. Putting it all together we obtain the truth value object v (depicted below) of 354 
the category of idempotents. 355 
 356 
 357 
Based on the truth value object v, logical operations negation, AND, and OR can be defined. 358 
Given a part P of an object A (of the category of idempotents), the familiar negation not(P) is 359 
defined as the largest part of A whose intersection with P is empty. Dually, another negation 360 
non(P) is defined as the smallest part of A whose union with P is the whole object A. In the 361 
category of sets, both negation operations—not, non—are identical. However, in the category of 362 
idempotents, these two negation operations can give different results (as shown below). The 363 
negation operation non allows logical contradiction: P AND non(P), which is boundary in 364 
geometric terminology (Lawvere, 1986, 1991; Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, p. 201). 365 
 366 
 367 
 368 
 369 
Furthermore, double negation can be bigger or smaller than identity depending on the nature of 370 
negation as shown below: 371 
true 
v: V → V 
u false 
P 
non(P) 
not(P) 
non(P
) 
P 
non(P) AND P 
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 372 
 373 
 374 
 375 
 376 
A2. Illusion-free Perception 377 
Consider a set A and a set V of values of properties of A.  A function 378 
p: A → V 379 
is a V-valued property of the set A. The set of all V-valued properties of A (or more broadly, the 380 
set of all functions from the domain set A to the codomain set V) is the map set V
A
. The set V
A
 381 
of properties, in turn, has properties, which are functionals 382 
q: V
A
 → V 383 
where the functional q is a V-valued property of the set V
A
 of all V-valued properties of A. Our 384 
objective is to reconstruct the set A from the set V
(VA)
 of properties of its V-valued properties 385 
(Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, pp. 125-126, 148-152). Towards this end, we define generalized 386 
point.  First recollect that a point of a set A is a function 387 
a: 1 → A 388 
P 
not(not(P)) 
not(P) 
P 
non(P) 
non(non((P)) 
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where 1 = {*} is the terminal set of the category of sets, i.e. a single-element set; hence points of 389 
a set correspond to its elements. Since elements of set completely characterize a set, we define 390 
generalized point so as to establish a 1-1 correspondence between points and generalized points 391 
(perceived elements). 392 
   A V-generalized point of the set A is a functional 393 
q: V
A
 → V 394 
such that for each V-valued property of A 395 
p: A → V 396 
and for every endomap of the property type V 397 
e: V → V 398 
the following equation is satisfied: 399 
q (e ◦ p) = e (q (p)) 400 
where ‗◦‘ denotes composition of functions and parentheses denote evaluation of functions. 401 
Let‘s first consider the left-hand side 402 
q (e ◦ p) 403 
The V-valued property of A 404 
p: A → V 405 
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is an element of the set V
A
 of all V-valued properties of A. Furthermore, since the codomain V 406 
of p is same as the domain V of 407 
e: V → V 408 
we can compose them to obtain a composite 409 
e ◦ p = A → V → V = A → V 410 
which is also an element of the set V
A
 of all V-valued properties of A; and hence when the 411 
functional 412 
q: V
A
 → V 413 
is evaluated at ‗e ◦ p‘ gives an element ‗v‘ of the set V of values 414 
q (e ◦ p) = v 415 
Let us now consider the right-hand side 416 
e (q (p)) 417 
Once again 418 
p: A → V 419 
is a V-valued property of A, i.e. an element of the set V
A
 of all V-valued properties of A. Hence 420 
evaluating the functional 421 
q: V
A
 → V 422 
at p gives a value 423 
24 
  
q (p) 424 
which is an element of the set V of values. Hence the endomap 425 
e: V → V 426 
when evaluated at the element ‗q (p)‘ of domain set V gives an element of V, i.e. 427 
e (q (p)) = v‘ 428 
Summing up, the functional 429 
q: V
A
 → V 430 
is a V-generalized point of A (perceived element of A) if for every 431 
p: A → V 432 
and for every 433 
e: V → V 434 
we find that 435 
q (e ◦ p) = e (q (p)) 436 
or in terms of our above example 437 
v = v‘. 438 
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   Returning to our main objective, i.e., establishing an isomorphism between points and 439 
perceived elements (generalized points) involves finding a property type V such that for every 440 
set A, the V-generalized points of A, i.e. the functionals 441 
q: V
A
 → V 442 
satisfying 443 
q (e ◦ p) = e (q (p)) 444 
for every 445 
p: A → V 446 
and for every 447 
e: V → V 448 
are in 1-1 correspondence with the points 449 
a: 1 → A 450 
of the set A. 451 
We give an example of perceived elements (generalized points) corresponding to points of a set. 452 
Let A = {a1, a2} be the object of our investigation and V = {0, 1} be the property type. There are 453 
two points in A 454 
a1: 1 → A 455 
and 456 
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a2: 1 → A 457 
Now let‘s calculate the number of generalized points. First, there are four functions from A to V, 458 
i.e., four V-valued properties of A, p: A → V (VA = 22 = 4) 459 
p1: A → V; p1(a1) = 0, p1(a2) = 0 460 
p2: A → V; p2(a1) = 1, p2(a2) = 0 461 
p3: A → V; p3(a1) = 0, p3(a2) = 1 462 
p4: A → V; p4(a1) = 1, p4(a2) = 1 463 
Thus, 464 
V
A
 = {p1, p2, p3, p4} 465 
Next, there are 16 functionals, q: V
A
 → V (V
(VA)
 = 2
(22)
 = 16) 466 
q1: V
A
 → V; q1(p1) = 0, q1(p2) = 0, q1(p3) = 0, q1(p4) = 0 467 
q2: V
A
 → V; q2(p1) = 1, q2(p2) = 0, q2(p3) = 0, q2(p4) = 0 468 
q3: V
A
 → V; q3(p1) = 0, q3(p2) = 1, q3(p3) = 0, q3(p4) = 0 469 
q4: V
A
 → V; q4(p1) = 1, q4(p2) = 1, q4(p3) = 0, q4(p4) = 0 470 
q5: V
A
 → V; q5(p1) = 0, q5(p2) = 0, q5(p3) = 1, q5(p4) = 0 471 
q6: V
A
 → V; q6(p1) = 1, q6(p2) = 0, q6(p3) = 1, q6(p4) = 0 472 
q7: V
A
 → V; q7(p1) = 0, q7(p2) = 1, q7(p3) = 1, q7(p4) = 0 473 
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q8: V
A
 → V; q8(p1) = 1, q8(p2) = 1, q8(p3) = 1, q8(p4) = 0 474 
q9: V
A
 → V; q9(p1) = 0, q9(p2) = 0, q9(p3) = 0, q9(p4) = 1 475 
q10: V
A
 → V; q10(p1) = 1, q10(p2) = 0, q10(p3) = 0, q10(p4) = 1 476 
q11: V
A
 → V; q11(p1) = 0, q11(p2) = 1, q11(p3) = 0, q11(p4) = 1 477 
q12: V
A
 → V; q12(p1) = 1, q12(p2) = 1, q12(p3) = 0, q12(p4) = 1 478 
q13: V
A
 → V; q13(p1) = 0, q13(p2) = 0, q13(p3) = 1, q13(p4) = 1 479 
q14: V
A
 → V; q14(p1) = 1, q14(p2) = 0, q14(p3) = 1, q14(p4) = 1 480 
q15: V
A
 → V; q15(p1) = 0, q15(p2) = 1, q15(p3) = 1, q15(p4) = 1 481 
q16: V
A
 → V; q16(p1) = 1, q16(p2) = 1, q16(p3) = 1, q16(p4) = 1 482 
Of these 16 functionals, there are only two V-generalized points of A corresponding to the two 483 
points of A = {a1, a2}. The two V-generalized points of A are 484 
q11: V
A
 → V; q11(p1) = 0, q11(p2) = 1, q11(p3) = 0, q11(p4) = 1 485 
and 486 
q13: V
A
 → V; q13(p1) = 0, q13(p2) = 0, q13(p3) = 1, q13(p4) = 1 487 
i.e. they both satisfy 488 
q (e ◦ p) = e (q (p)) 489 
Let‘s consider the functional 490 
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q11: V
A
 → V; q11(p1) = 0, q11(p2) = 1, q11(p3) = 0, q11(p4) = 1 491 
In order for the functional q11 to be a V-generalized point of A, it has to satisfy 492 
q11 (e ◦ p) = e (q11 (p)) 493 
for all four p: A → V and all four endomaps e: V → V.  They are 494 
e1: V → V; e1(0) = 0, e1(1) = 0 495 
e2: V → V; e2(0) = 1, e2(1) = 0 496 
e3: V → V; e3(0) = 0, e3(1) = 1 497 
e4: V → V; e4(0) = 1, e4(1) = 1 498 
So, the set of all endomaps of property type V is V
V
 = {e1, e2, e3, e4}. 499 
Thus, there are 16 cases we have to evaluate to show that the functional 500 
q11: V
A
 → V; q11(p1) = 0, q11(p2) = 1, q11(p3) = 0, q11(p4) = 1 501 
is a V-generalized point of A. 502 
Case 1: (p1, e1) 503 
q11 (e1 ◦ p1) = e1 (q11 (p1)) 504 
LHS: q11 (e1 ◦ p1) = q11 (p1) = 0 505 
RHS: e1 (q11 (p1)) = e1 (0) = 0 506 
Case 2: (p2, e1) 507 
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q11 (e1 ◦ p2) = e1 (q11 (p2)) 508 
LHS: q11 (e1 ◦ p2) = q11 (p1) = 0 509 
RHS: e1 (q11 (p2)) = e1 (1) = 0 510 
Case 3: (p3, e1) 511 
q11 (e1 ◦ p3) = e1 (q11 (p3)) 512 
LHS: q11 (e1 ◦ p3) = q11 (p1) = 0 513 
RHS: e1 (q11 (p3)) = e1 (0) = 0 514 
Case 4: (p4, e1) 515 
q11 (e1 ◦ p4) = e1 (q11 (p4)) 516 
LHS: q11 (e1 ◦ p4) = q11 (p1) = 0 517 
RHS: e1 (q11 (p4)) = e1 (1) = 0 518 
q11: V
A
 → V; q11(p1) = 0, q11(p2) = 1, q11(p3) = 0, q11(p4) = 1 519 
Case 5: (p1, e2) 520 
q11 (e2 ◦ p1) = e2 (q11 (p1)) 521 
LHS: q11 (e2 ◦ p1) = q11 (p4) = 1 522 
RHS: e2 (q11 (p1)) = e2 (0) = 1 523 
Case 6: (p2, e2) 524 
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q11 (e2 ◦ p2) = e2 (q11 (p2)) 525 
LHS: q11 (e2 ◦ p2) = q11 (p3) = 0 526 
RHS: e2 (q11 (p2)) = e2 (1) = 0 527 
Case 7: (p3, e2) 528 
q11 (e2 ◦ p3) = e2 (q11 (p3)) 529 
LHS: q11 (e2 ◦ p3) = q11 (p2) = 1 530 
RHS: e2 (q11 (p3)) = e2 (0) = 1 531 
Case 8: (p4, e2) 532 
q11 (e2 ◦ p4) = e2 (q11 (p4)) 533 
LHS: q11 (e2 ◦ p4) = q11 (p1) = 0 534 
RHS: e2 (q11 (p4)) = e2 (1) = 0 535 
q11: V
A
 → V; q11(p1) = 0, q11(p2) = 1, q11(p3) = 0, q11(p4) = 1 536 
Case 9: (p1, e3) 537 
q11 (e3 ◦ p1) = e3 (q11 (p1)) 538 
LHS: q11 (e3 ◦ p1) = q11 (p1) = 0 539 
RHS: e3 (q11 (p1)) = e3 (0) = 0 540 
Case 10: (p2, e3) 541 
31 
  
q11 (e3 ◦ p2) = e3 (q11 (p2)) 542 
LHS: q11 (e3 ◦ p2) = q11 (p2) = 1 543 
RHS: e3 (q11 (p2)) = e3 (1) = 1 544 
Case 11: (p3, e3) 545 
q11 (e3 ◦ p3) = e3 (q11 (p3)) 546 
LHS: q11 (e3 ◦ p3) = q11 (p3) = 0 547 
RHS: e3 (q11 (p3)) = e3 (0) = 0 548 
Case 12: (p4, e3) 549 
q11 (e3 ◦ p4) = e3 (q11 (p4)) 550 
LHS: q11 (e3 ◦ p4) = q11 (p4) = 1 551 
RHS: e3 (q11 (p4)) = e3 (1) = 1 552 
q11: V
A
 → V; q11(p1) = 0, q11(p2) = 1, q11(p3) = 0, q11(p4) = 1 553 
Case 13: (p1, e4) 554 
q11 (e4 ◦ p1) = e4 (q11 (p1)) 555 
LHS: q11 (e4 ◦ p1) = q11 (p4) = 1 556 
RHS: e4 (q11 (p1)) = e4 (0) = 1 557 
Case 14: (p2, e4) 558 
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q11 (e4 ◦ p2) = e4 (q11 (p2)) 559 
LHS: q11 (e4 ◦ p2) = q11 (p4) = 1 560 
RHS: e4 (q11 (p2)) = e4 (1) = 1 561 
Case 15: (p3, e4) 562 
q11 (e4 ◦ p3) = e4 (q11 (p3)) 563 
LHS: q11 (e4 ◦ p3) = q11 (p4) = 1 564 
RHS: e4 (q11 (p3)) = e4 (0) = 1 565 
Case 16: (p4, e4) 566 
q11 (e4 ◦ p4) = e4 (q11 (p4)) 567 
LHS: q11 (e4 ◦ p4) = q11 (p4) = 1 568 
RHS: e4 (q11 (p4)) = e4 (1) = 1 569 
Thus, the functional 570 
q11: V
A
 → V; q11(p1) = 0, q11(p2) = 1, q11(p3) = 0, q11(p4) = 1 571 
is a V-generalized point of A. Along similar lines, we can show that the functional 572 
q13: V
A
 → V; q13(p1) = 0, q13(p2) = 0, q13(p3) = 1, q13(p4) = 1 573 
is another V-generalized point of A. These two perceived elements (generalized points) 574 
correspond to the two points 575 
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a1: 1 → A 576 
a2: 1 → A 577 
of the set A = {a1, a2}. 578 
   Next, we give an example of a functional (one of the remaining 14 functionals of the total 16 579 
functionals) which is not a generalized point. Consider the functional 580 
q12: V
A
 → V; q12(p1) = 1, q12(p2) = 1, q12(p3) = 0, q12(p4) = 1 581 
In order to be a V-generalized point of A, the functional 582 
q12: V
A
 → V 583 
must satisfy 584 
q12 (e ◦ p) = e (q12 (p)) 585 
for all p in V
A
 = {p1, p2, p3, p4} and for all e in V
V
 = {e1, e2, e3, e4}, i.e., for all 16 cases we 586 
evaluated earlier.  Let‘s consider the case of p = p1 and e = e1. We have to check for the equality 587 
q12 (e1 ◦ p1) = e1 (q12 (p1)) 588 
LHS: q12 (e1 ◦ p1) = q12 (p1) = 1 589 
RHS: e1 (q12 (p1)) = e1 (1) = 0 590 
Since LHS is not equal to RHS, the functional 591 
q12: V
A
 → V; q12(p1) = 1, q12(p2) = 1, q12(p3) = 0, q12(p4) = 1 592 
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is not a V-generalized point of A. 593 
   Now we spell out how each point of a set gives rise to a generalized point (perceived element). 594 
Consider a set A and a type V. Since generalized point is a functional 595 
q: V
A
 → V 596 
we first construct a functional called evaluation functional for each element ‗a‘ of the set A. 597 
Recollect that the elements of domain set V
A
 of the functional q are V-valued properties of A, 598 
i.e. 599 
p: A → V 600 
and the functional q assigns to each p in V
A
 an element ‗v‘ of the codomain set V of the 601 
functional q. An evaluation functional corresponding to an element ‗a‘ of the set A is defined as 602 
qa: V
A
 → V 603 
with 604 
qa(p) = p(a) 605 
Now we show that this evaluation functional is a generalized point, i.e. satisfies 606 
qa(e ◦ p) = e (qa(p)) 607 
where 608 
e: V → V 609 
is an endomap on the type V of property. 610 
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LHS: qa(e ◦ p) = (e ◦ p) (a) = e(p(a)) 611 
RHS: e (qa(p)) = e(p(a)) 612 
Thus, the evaluation functional corresponding to each point of a set is a generalized point 613 
(Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, p. 150). We now give an example of this general result. 614 
Consider a set A = {a1, a2, a3} and a property type V = {0, 1}.  The set V
A
 of all V-valued 615 
properties of A consists of 8 functions, i.e. 616 
V
A
 = {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8} 617 
where 618 
p1: A → V; p1(a1) = 0, p1(a2) = 0, p1(a3) = 0 619 
p2: A → V; p2(a1) = 1, p2(a2) = 0, p2(a3) = 0 620 
p3: A → V; p3(a1) = 0, p3(a2) = 1, p3(a3) = 0 621 
p4: A → V; p4(a1) = 1, p4(a2) = 1, p4(a3) = 0 622 
p5: A → V; p5(a1) = 0, p5(a2) = 0, p5(a3) = 1 623 
p6: A → V; p6(a1) = 1, p6(a2) = 0, p6(a3) = 1 624 
p7: A → V; p7(a1) = 0, p7(a2) = 1, p7(a3) = 1 625 
p8: A → V; p8(a1) = 1, p8(a2) = 1, p8(a3) = 1 626 
Let us now consider a point 627 
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a1: 1 → A 628 
and the corresponding evaluation functional 629 
qa1: V
A
 → V 630 
defined as 631 
qa1(p) = p(a1) 632 
for all p in V
A
, i.e. 633 
qa1(p1) = p1(a1) = 0 634 
qa1(p2) = p2(a1) = 1 635 
qa1(p3) = p3(a1) = 0 636 
qa1(p4) = p4(a1) = 1 637 
qa1(p5) = p5(a1) = 0 638 
qa1(p6) = p6(a1) = 1 639 
qa1(p7) = p7(a1) = 0 640 
qa1(p8) = p8(a1) = 1 641 
Now we have to show that this evaluation functional 642 
qa1: V
A
 → V 643 
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satisfies 644 
qa1 (e ◦ p) = e (qa1 (p)) 645 
for all elements (V-valued properties of A) p in V
A
 = {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8}, and for all 646 
elements (endomaps of property type V) e in V
V
 = {e1, e2, e3, e4} defined as 647 
e1: V → V; e1(0) = 0, e1(1) = 0 648 
e2: V → V; e2(0) = 1, e2(1) = 0 649 
e3: V → V; e3(0) = 0, e3(1) = 1 650 
e4: V → V; e4(0) = 1, e4(1) = 1 651 
Thus we have to test for the equality 652 
qa1 (e ◦ p) = e (qa1 (p)) 653 
in 32 cases. They are: 654 
Case 1: (p1, e1) 655 
qa1 (e1 ◦ p1) = e1 (qa1 (p1)) 656 
LHS: qa1 (e1 ◦ p1) = qa1 (p1) = 0 657 
RHS: e1 (qa1 (p1)) = e1 (0) = 0 658 
Case 2: (p2, e1) 659 
qa1 (e1 ◦ p2) = e1 (qa1 (p2)) 660 
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LHS: qa1 (e1 ◦ p2) = qa1 (p1) = 0 661 
RHS: e1 (qa1 (p2)) = e1 (1) = 0 662 
Case 3: (p3, e1) 663 
qa1 (e1 ◦ p3) = e1 (qa1 (p3)) 664 
LHS: qa1 (e1 ◦ p3) = qa1 (p1) = 0 665 
RHS: e1 (qa1 (p3)) = e1 (0) = 0 666 
Case 4: (p4, e1) 667 
qa1 (e1 ◦ p4) = e1 (qa1 (p4)) 668 
LHS: qa1 (e1 ◦ p4) = qa1 (p1) = 0 669 
RHS: e1 (qa1 (p4)) = e1 (1) = 0 670 
Case 5: (p5, e1) 671 
qa1 (e1 ◦ p5) = e1 (qa1 (p5)) 672 
LHS: qa1 (e1 ◦ p5) = qa1 (p1) = 0 673 
RHS: e1 (qa1 (p5)) = e1 (0) = 0 674 
Case 6: (p6, e1) 675 
qa1 (e1 ◦ p6) = e1 (qa1 (p6)) 676 
LHS: qa1 (e1 ◦ p6) = qa1 (p1) = 0 677 
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RHS: e1 (qa1 (p6)) = e1 (1) = 0 678 
Case 7: (p7, e1) 679 
qa1 (e1 ◦ p7) = e1 (qa1 (p7)) 680 
LHS: qa1 (e1 ◦ p7) = qa1 (p1) = 0 681 
RHS: e1 (qa1 (p7)) = e1 (0) = 0 682 
Case 8: (p8, e1) 683 
qa1 (e1 ◦ p8) = e1 (qa1 (p8)) 684 
LHS: qa1 (e1 ◦ p8) = qa1 (p1) = 0 685 
RHS: e1 (qa1 (p8)) = e1 (1) = 0 686 
Case 9: (p1, e2) 687 
qa1 (e2 ◦ p1) = e2 (qa1 (p1)) 688 
LHS: qa1 (e2 ◦ p1) = qa1 (p8) = 1 689 
RHS: e2 (qa1 (p1)) = e2 (0) = 1 690 
Case 10: (p2, e2) 691 
qa1 (e2 ◦ p2) = e2 (qa1 (p2)) 692 
LHS: qa1 (e2 ◦ p2) = qa1 (p7) = 0 693 
RHS: e2 (qa1 (p2)) = e2 (1) = 0 694 
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Case 11: (p3, e2) 695 
qa1 (e2 ◦ p3) = e2 (qa1 (p3)) 696 
LHS: qa1 (e2 ◦ p3) = qa1 (p6) = 1 697 
RHS: e2 (qa1 (p3)) = e2 (0) = 1 698 
Case 12: (p4, e2) 699 
qa1 (e2 ◦ p4) = e2 (qa1 (p4)) 700 
LHS: qa1 (e2 ◦ p4) = qa1 (p5) = 0 701 
RHS: e2 (qa1 (p4)) = e2 (1) = 0 702 
Case 13: (p5, e2) 703 
qa1 (e2 ◦ p5) = e2 (qa1 (p5)) 704 
LHS: qa1 (e2 ◦ p5) = qa1 (p4) = 1 705 
RHS: e2 (qa1 (p5)) = e2 (0) = 1 706 
Case 14: (p6, e2) 707 
qa1 (e2 ◦ p6) = e2 (qa1 (p6)) 708 
LHS: qa1 (e2 ◦ p6) = qa1 (p3) = 0 709 
RHS: e2 (qa1 (p6)) = e2 (1) = 0 710 
Case 15: (p7, e2) 711 
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qa1 (e2 ◦ p7) = e2 (qa1 (p7)) 712 
LHS: qa1 (e2 ◦ p7) = qa1 (p2) = 1 713 
RHS: e2 (qa1 (p7)) = e2 (0) = 1 714 
Case 16: (p8, e2) 715 
qa1 (e2 ◦ p8) = e2 (qa1 (p8)) 716 
LHS: qa1 (e2 ◦ p8) = qa1 (p1) = 0 717 
RHS: e2 (qa1 (p8)) = e2 (1) = 0 718 
Case 17: (p1, e3) 719 
qa1 (e3 ◦ p1) = e3 (qa1 (p1)) 720 
LHS: qa1 (e3 ◦ p1) = qa1 (p1) = 0 721 
RHS: e3 (qa1 (p1)) = e3 (0) = 0 722 
Case 18: (p2, e3) 723 
qa1 (e3 ◦ p2) = e3 (qa1 (p2)) 724 
LHS: qa1 (e3 ◦ p2) = qa1 (p2) = 1 725 
RHS: e3 (qa1 (p2)) = e3 (1) = 1 726 
Case 19: (p3, e3) 727 
qa1 (e3 ◦ p3) = e3 (qa1 (p3)) 728 
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LHS: qa1 (e3 ◦ p3) = qa1 (p3) = 0 729 
RHS: e3 (qa1 (p3)) = e3 (0) = 0 730 
Case 20: (p4, e3) 731 
qa1 (e3 ◦ p4) = e3 (qa1 (p4)) 732 
LHS: qa1 (e3 ◦ p4) = qa1 (p4) = 1 733 
RHS: e3 (qa1 (p4)) = e3 (1) = 1 734 
Case 21: (p5, e3) 735 
qa1 (e3 ◦ p5) = e3 (qa1 (p5)) 736 
LHS: qa1 (e3 ◦ p5) = qa1 (p5) = 0 737 
RHS: e3 (qa1 (p5)) = e3 (0) = 0 738 
Case 22: (p6, e3) 739 
qa1 (e3 ◦ p6) = e3 (qa1 (p6)) 740 
LHS: qa1 (e3 ◦ p6) = qa1 (p6) = 1 741 
RHS: e3 (qa1 (p6)) = e3 (1) = 1 742 
Case 23: (p7, e3) 743 
qa1 (e3 ◦ p7) = e3 (qa1 (p7)) 744 
LHS: qa1 (e3 ◦ p7) = qa1 (p7) = 0 745 
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RHS: e3 (qa1 (p7)) = e3 (0) = 0 746 
Case 24: (p8, e3) 747 
qa1 (e3 ◦ p8) = e3 (qa1 (p8)) 748 
LHS: qa1 (e3 ◦ p8) = qa1 (p8) = 1 749 
RHS: e3 (qa1 (p8)) = e3 (1) = 1 750 
Case 25: (p1, e4) 751 
qa1 (e4 ◦ p1) = e4 (qa1 (p1)) 752 
LHS: qa1 (e4 ◦ p1) = qa1 (p8) = 1 753 
RHS: e4 (qa1 (p1)) = e4 (0) = 1 754 
Case 26: (p2, e4) 755 
qa1 (e4 ◦ p2) = e4 (qa1 (p2)) 756 
LHS: qa1 (e4 ◦ p2) = qa1 (p8) = 1 757 
RHS: e4 (qa1 (p2)) = e4 (1) = 1 758 
Case 27: (p3, e4) 759 
qa1 (e4 ◦ p3) = e4 (qa1 (p3)) 760 
LHS: qa1 (e4 ◦ p3) = qa1 (p8) = 1 761 
RHS: e4 (qa1 (p3)) = e4 (0) = 1 762 
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Case 28: (p4, e4) 763 
qa1 (e4 ◦ p4) = e4 (qa1 (p4)) 764 
LHS: qa1 (e4 ◦ p4) = qa1 (p8) = 1 765 
RHS: e4 (qa1 (p4)) = e4 (1) = 1 766 
Case 29: (p5, e4) 767 
qa1 (e4 ◦ p5) = e4 (qa1 (p5)) 768 
LHS: qa1 (e4 ◦ p5) = qa1 (p8) = 1 769 
RHS: e4 (qa1 (p5)) = e4 (0) = 1 770 
Case 30: (p6, e4) 771 
qa1 (e4 ◦ p6) = e4 (qa1 (p6)) 772 
LHS: qa1 (e4 ◦ p6) = qa1 (p8) = 1 773 
RHS: e4 (qa1 (p6)) = e4 (1) = 1 774 
Case 31: (p7, e4) 775 
qa1 (e4 ◦ p7) = e4 (qa1 (p7)) 776 
LHS: qa1 (e4 ◦ p7) = qa1 (p8) = 1 777 
RHS: e4 (qa1 (p7)) = e4 (0) = 1 778 
Case 32: (p8, e4) 779 
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qa1 (e4 ◦ p8) = e4 (qa1 (p8)) 780 
LHS: qa1 (e4 ◦ p8) = qa1 (p8) = 1 781 
RHS: e4 (qa1 (p8)) = e4 (1) = 1 782 
Thus the evaluation functional 783 
qa1: V
A
 → V; qa1(p1)=0, qa1(p2)=1, qa1(p3)=0, qa1(p4)=1, qa1(p5)=0, qa1(p6)=1, qa1(p7)=0, qa1(p8)=1 784 
satisfying 785 
qa1 (e ◦ p) = e (qa1 (p)) 786 
(for all p: A → V and for all e: V → V) is a V-generalized point of A corresponding to the point 787 
a1: 1 → A 788 
Along the same lines, we can show that each of remaining two points of the set A = {a1, a2, a3} 789 
give rise to corresponding V-generalized points of A. 790 
   With property type V = 2 (two-element set), although there is a V-generalized point of A 791 
corresponding to each point of A, there can also be generalized points that do not correspond to 792 
any points of A, which we may call illusions (or ghost points). In order to obtain a 1-1 793 
correspondence between points of any set A and V-generalized points of A, i.e. isomorphism 794 
between objects and perceived objects, we need a 3-element set as the property type V. One of 795 
our objectives is to calculate objects analogous to the 3-element set (in the category of sets) in 796 
categories that are reflective of reality such as the category of categories. We plan to approach 797 
this goal by calculating the basic types of knowing (objects analogous to 3-element set in the 798 
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category of sets) in more structured categories such as dynamical systems, functions, graphs, and 799 
actions.  800 
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